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This thesis examines different strategies for a patrol
boat in a riverine ambush before and after the ambush.
Mathematical models employing concepts from games of
strategy and statistical decision theory are used to study
optimal tactics for the patrol boat before the ambush. A
matrix game with the payoff a function of combat outcomes
and combattant utility functions is used to study the op-
timal tactics for the boat and the ambushers . Using concepts
of the statistical decision theory, various principles of
choice are used to choose the appropriate decisions among
all possible courses of action for the patrol boat.
Several combat models are used to investigate the patrol
boat's tactics after the ambush has commenced. A determin-
istic Lanchester-type model with lethalities of fires that
vary linearly with range is used to determine the casualty
ratio between the two opponents. A stochastic model with
constant attrition rates is used to calculate part of the
probability distribution of the number of combattants alive
at time t after the initiation of the ambush. Finally, a
stochastic duel with displacement is used to determine the
probability that one side would win in the ambush.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss some mathemat-
ical models of land combat that can be used to gain insight
into tactics in a riverine ambush.
Lanchester-type models of combat and the theory of
stochastic duels are used to determine the ambush outcomes
at each stage in terms of the casualties sustained by the
opposing forces. These models are used to estimate the con-
sequences of different tactics for both the ambusher and
ambushee . For each combination of tactics of the ambusher
and ambushee, an entry for the payoff matrix of a general
two-person game is generated. This game is then solved to
determine the optimal tactic for each side.
In a land ambush, because of the surprise element in
the ambush and because of the favorable terrain for the
ambushers , defensive cover is initially minimal. As the
engagement progresses, the ambushee seeks whatever cover
is available and gradually improves his situation. The
attachers , on the other hand, have a relative secure posi-
tion that remains constant until the contest ends or until
they choose to break off the engagement. The ambushees
generally enter the contest by engaging in area fire, be-
cause of their lack of preparation for the immediate con-
flict. However as the battle unfolds, the defense maneuvers,
attempts to locate the attackers, rushes the opponent's posi-
tion if possible, and gradually switches from area fire to

aimed fire. The ambushers, on the other hand, engage in
aimed fire throughout, although its net quality deterio-
rates with time [Ref . 1]
.
In a riverine ambush, the situation is somewhat differ-
ent. First of all, due to the boat's superstructure, the
ambushee does not need to seek cover elsewhere. He can
stay right in his position and fire back at the ambushers.
Secondly, since the ambushers have to choose the point of
ambush close to the river, consequently they make themselves
easy to be identified by the ambushees staying on the river,
therefore the latter can enter the contest by engaging in
aimed fire almost immediately from the start. Thirdly, due
to the boat's maneuverability, the attackers do not enjoy
the advantage of using aimed fire as effectively as in the
case of a land ambush.
Nevertheless, in both types of ambushes, one is expected
to get involved with the same basic factors of major impor-
tance which are so closely related to the general principles
of guerrilla- warfare that it is found necessary first to
present some of these military thoughts before attempting to
formulate the main problem. Needless to say, it is these
principles that based upon them the commanders of both sides
make their logical decisions at each stage of the fighting.
A. BASIC GUERRILLA TACTICS
Besides the political essence which is the vital char-
acteristic of any guerrilla movement, the basic guerrilla

tactics are expressed operationally in the Communist's
habitual refusal to accept combat unless vistory is certain.
For the guerrilla fighters, one of the two insuring factors
in the effort to try to be a winner in any engagement is
accurate intelligence of both the enemy and the terrain.
The second factor is the ability to concentrate secretly
and vastly superior forces at the point of contact so that
enemy units would be annihilated "one by one".
It is well remembered that, centuries ago, Sun Tzu al-
ready wrote: "Now war is based on deception. Move when it
is advantageous , and create changes in the situation by
dispersal and concentration of forces" [Ref. 2].
Today, Red China's ten principles are again the simple
rules derived from the same basic thought but so effectively
applied by the Communist Vietnam in its effort to try to
take over the South that it is found worth-while to mention
in this discussion some of them, especially the ones closely
related to a riverine ambush.
First among the ten principles of the Chinese Reds is
"...strike at scattered and isolated enemies, and later
strike at the powerful enemies." Foremost in consistency
and chronology was the North Vietnam's application of this
axiom r which might be called the tactics of digestion with-
out indigestion, a principle which was proportionate to the
means at hand. The North Vietnam instructs the local Viet-
cong to attack the outposts, the patrolling boats before
they try to attack the main bases.

The North Vietnam's forces also try to apply the fourth
principle: "In every battle, concentrate absolutely superior
forces.." This they usually do almost in every engagement,
either small or big. An ambushed boat is also the subject
of this axiom.
Consistently choosing its own conditions of battle, the
North Vietnam adheres to the fifth principle: "Fight no un-
prepared engagements. Fight no engagements in which there
is no assurance of victory." If they ambush a boat, they
often choose to ambush from the right place and at the right
time such as at the bends of the rivers and when the tide
is low.
The North Vietnam's warriors are also subjected to the
sixth principle which is "fear no sacrifice, fatigue" and
to the seventh principle: "Strive to destroy the enemy while
he is in movement" [Ref . 3]
.
B. COUNTER GUERRILLA TACTICS
Before entering into the discussion of the mechanics of
killing the Communist Guerrillas, it is found necessary to
mention is passing that, here again the political aspects
such as follows are sine qua non
:
1. Win the people. The bulk of this fight for the
minds and hearts of the people must be a political fight,
a fight waged by all means of the propaganda machine and
most important of all, by the super examples of the true
leaders from the highest levels to the lowest levels with

over-all emphasis on the high levels since only great
leaders can produce great subordinates and not vice versa.
Then the mechanics are:
2. Indoctrinate thoroughly the troops in the technique
of political warfare and they must be familiar with their
part in the war. The best potential counter-guerrilla force
in any part of a country is a force from that part of that
country.
Strange as it may be, tactics have always taken a rather
back place to political, psychological, and intelligence
factors in guerrilla wars that have been won [Ref . 4]
.
Military field tactics used against guerrillas are not
unusual in any way. They are somewhat similar to the con-
ventional operations with some variations.
Besides the all-out importance of the general theory of
counter-guerrilla war such as to destroy the enemy lines of
external support and to destroy the enemy's mobility, suc-
cessful operations against guerrillas in small unit opera-
tions will often be the result of successful patrols and
form an essential element of counter-insurgent warfare.
Routine patrolling seldom produces positive results.
Because of the terrain, vegetation, and enemy tactics,
modifications of normal techniques may be necessary. Patrol
need to be all purpose: prepared to fight, ambush, pursue,
and reconnoiter [Ref. 5]. These activities are applied to
the infantry troops as well as to the riverine patrolling

crafts. However, for a patrol boat, it is more likely that
she is subject to the ambushes than to anything else, there-
fore she should be well prepared in advance for such things
as course, speed, special equipment, action if ambushed and
method of attack.

II. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
A. SCENARIO
Two homogeneous forces, a Blue force and a Red force
were engaged in combat.
The Blue force was a patrol boat with many missions to
carry, one of which was to patrol along an assigned river.
This patrol had the purpose of trying to discourage the
Red force's attempt to move men and supplies from the sanc-
tuary areas, along or across the river, into the areas of
operations. Another purpose of this kind of patrol was to
protect the Blue force's supply and operations route either
from the sea to the inland bases or between the inland bases
themselves
.
The Red force was the ambushing force whose purpose was
to harass the Blue force's patrolling mission by trying to
inflict to it as many casualties as possible.
The river in question was an imitation of the CUA-LON
and BO-DE rivers in the NAM-CAN region in the southermost
part of South Vietnam (Fig. 1). The river therefore was
about three hundreds meters wide in the average. This
meant that if the boat sailed close to one side of the
river, she would be relatively safe from the ambushers
rockets fired from the other side of the river although she
was still well within the effective range of the rockets.
The river was deep and navigable at all times even when the
tide was low. It also had relative steep banks all along
it even at the many bends where it changed directions
10
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sharply. These two factors suggested that the patrol boat
could always sail close enough to either side of the river
if she chose to do so.
According to past experiences that took place in the
joint U.S.-VIENAMESE operations SEAFLOAT and SOLID ANCHOR
during the years 196 8-1970 in the NAM-CAN region, the Red
force usually chose to set up the ambush at the bends of
the river. There were several reasons which supported this
decision
.
First of all, at the bends of the river, since the cur-
rent was relatively stronger than at the other places, the
boat's maneuverability was greatly limited, therefore the
boat's overall command to direct the counter-attack would
become less effective.
Secondly, if the ambushers chose to ambush from the
outside of the bend, they would enjoy the boat's minimum'
return fire power since right after the first firings, the
boat would have to turn, hence to face her stern to the
ambushers. It was logically assumed that onboard the boat,
the guns were mostly distributed along her port and her
star-board side.
Thirdly, at the bends of the river, the area was much
broader in the outside than in the inside, consequently
when the ambushers needed to disperse their force and ran
away they would find the pursuing fire much less devastating
Fourthly, since at the bends of the river, there usually
were some small canals near-by, the ambushers would be able
12

to hide or to evade rather quickly and safely once they
wanted to break contact with the boat.
B. GENERAL FORMULATION
The problem is divided in two main parts.
The first part consists of finding the optimal strategy
before the ambush for the two players, namely player A or
the Blue force and player B or the Red force.
The second part consists of finding the optimal strategy
after the initial ambush for the same two players, namely,
the patrol boat and the ambushers , assuming that both sides
had used a certain set of pure strategies before the ambush.
However, since the Red force has only two obvious strategies,
i.e., either engage the enemy or break contact, this part
deals mainly with the Blue force's strategies.
In all these two parts as well as in any military con-
flict between two opponents , the outcome or payoff depends
on their decisions. Furthermore, a player does not know his
opponent's strategy when he makes a decision. Therefore,
each player must evaluate his opponent's capabilities, which
in turn depend on the opponent's evaluation of the first
side's capabilities, and these evaluations must be based on
such essential elements as intelligence, fire power, survival
probabilities and so on.
In a military conflict, the participants have .opposing
objectives - e.g., an attacker wishes to maximize the damage
done to a defender's targets, while the defender wishes to




Several, game-theoretic models are used to gain insight
into optimal tactics for both sides in a pre-formulated
scenario.
Several different modelling methodologies are used to
generate the payoff matrix entries in these games. In the
first instance, deterministic Lanchester-type equations of
warfare are used to determine the consequences of various
alternative tactics for both sides. Other modelling meth-
odologies using probabilistic approaches such as stochastic
models are also used for the same purpose. Then a solution
to the game would give instructions to each participant how
best to choose from his available alternatives in order to
best attain his objective.
Now, there are many ways to define and measure the com-
bat effectiveness applied to the outcome or payoff of a
military conflict.
According to Philip Hayward [Ref . 7] , the only way of
"measuring" the effectiveness of an organization, of what-
ever kind, is through the analysis of data on its perfor-
mance under actual operating conditions. To obtain meaning-
ful results from such analyses is often a difficult task,
it is particularly difficult for an army combat unit, for
the simple reason that the organization performs the tasks
for which it was created only at rare intervals. If one
wishes to measure or, more precisely, estimate P(S) , the
probability of success in combat operations, for a particu-
lar combat unit, enemy, environment, and mission, one must
14

find a number of cases filling the requirements and compute
the frequency of success. Since historical records of com-
bat are rarely compiled with this end of view, the research
effort involved would be of formidable magnitude, particu-
larly since the task would have to be repeated for each
different situation. Furthermore, the results would apply
only to combat units of the past, the effectiveness of new
and untried organizations would remain unknown.
For these reasons, the problem of greater practical
interest is the extent to which one can "predict" combat
effectiveness on the basis of the empirical data, theory,
and expert judgment available at the time.
Moreover, the most common measure of effectiveness ap-
plied to the outcome of a military engagement in guerrilla
and counter-guerrilla operations has been the casualty
ratio. A military commander today is presumed to be jus-
tified in sustaining heavy casualties to his own • force if
proportionately larger casualties are inflicted on the
enemy, while a commander who suffers losses without in-
flicting greater harm on the adversary is judged a poor
commander, regardless of the relative importance of the
engagements in the overall conflict.
Since the purpose of this study is to provide military
commanders with a realistic planning model, the casualty
ratio will be accepted as a measure of effectiveness so
that an optimum strategy can be chosen among the reasonable
and available strategies without further justification.
15

Consequently, an optimal strategy for a player is defined
as the strategy that gives the player the highest casualty
ratio which is the ratio between the casualties suffered
by his enemy and the casualties suffered by his own force.
16

III. BEFOPE THE AMBUSH
A. A GAME OF STRATEGY
Before the ambush, the patrol boat's Captain can influ-
ence the outcome of the ambush by his behavior and he is
interested in the outcome of the situation. The Commander
of the ambushing forces can also influence the outcome by
his behavior and he too is interested in the outcome of the
situation. Thus the two players in this game would have to
try to collect all available informations as accurate as
possible about the terrain, about his own forces' capabil-
ities as well as about all their possible courses of action
The set of players is I = { Boat, Ambushers }
1 . Strategies
Considering past combat experiences and all the in-
formations mentioned above, it is assumed that each player
has a finite number of strategies as follows (Fig. 2)
:
Au , denotes the set of stategies of the patrol boat's
Captain
^boat
: { Aboat' Aboat' Aboat }
where :
A} = Sail the boat in the middle of the riverboat
A^ = Sail the boat close to the outside of the bendboat
of the river




Aamkusk denotes the set of strategies of the Commander
of the ambushing forces




A 1 , . = ambush from the outside of the bend of the
ambush
river






For this game, the following outcomes are mutually
exclusive
:
ej = the boat gets hit and the ambushers survive
e 2 = the boat gets hit and the ambushers are destroyed
e 3 = the boat is intact and the ambushers survive
e^ = the boat is intact and the ambushers are destroyed
Note that the above outcomes are considered to be
extremely general. One does not consider the special cases
such as the payoffs of each side due to each player's re-
spective strategies at each stage of the game after the
ambush. Nor does one consider the strength as well as the
fire-power of each side which may result in just one out-
come, e.g. , one side may be wiped out in just a few seconds
after the ambush is started as one may see in the later
parts of this study.
3 Outcome Functions
Let the probability of the outcomes e- be p- where
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, one has the set of all mixed outcomes p:
18

Figure 2. The Players* Strategies
19

p = (Pi / p 2 / P3/ Pl»)
Based on the author's past combat experience and
judgments, the probabilities of the following individual
outcomes resulted from all possible combinations of courses
of action of each player are assigned as follows:
a. Sail the boat in the middle of the river
(1) Get ambushed from the outside of the bend of
the river
Probability (boat gets hit) = 0.8
Probability (ambushers survive) = 0.8
(2) Get ambushed from the inside of the bend of
the river
Probability (boat gets hit) =0.8
Probability (ambushers survive) = 0.4
b. Sail the boat close to the outside of the bend of
the river
(1) Get ambushed from the outside of the bend of
the river
Probability (boat gets hit) =0.9
Probability (ambushers survive) = 0.7
(2) Get ambushed from the inside of the bend of
the river
Probability (boat gets hit) = 0.1
Probability (ambushers survive) = 0.4




(1) Get ambushed from the outside of the bend of
the river
Probability (boat gets hit) = 0.1
Probability (ambushers survive) =0.9
(2) Get ambushed from the inside of the bend of
the river
Probability (boat gets hit) =0.9
Probability (ambushers survive) = 0.3
Therefore, one can get the following probabilities table for
the outcome functions p
Aboat ambush Pi P 2 P 3 Pk
A 1boat A
1





ambush 0.32 0.48 0.08 0.12
A 2boat A
1





ambush 0.05 0.05 0.45 0.45
A 3boat A
1
ambush 0.09 0.01 0.81 0.09
ooat
A 2
ambush 0.27 0.63 0.03 0.07
4 . Preference Relations and Utility Functions
A player's subjective probabilities are numerical
representations of his beliefs and information. His
utilities are numerical representations of his tastes and
preferences [Ref . 8] .
Now, as a matter of fact, the patrol boat's Captain
would like his boat not to get hit and whether getting hit
or not, he would like to wipe out the ambushing enemy.
21

Furthermore, since he still has other missions to carry be-
sides his main mission of patrolling along the river, he
would consider the fact that his boat gets hit and his
enemy destroyed as equal preference to the fact that his
boat is intact and his enemy can survive.
As for the ambushers, it is natural that they would
prefer above all to hit the boat and to survive. Further-
more, since they are limited in numbers and their main mis-
sion is to harass the enemy as often as possible, they would
prefer to survive after the ambush even at the price of not
hitting the boat.
These feelings, expressed by the two players, define
the following preference relations and utility functions:
The patrol boat's Captain
Preference relations: e
2
< e 2 ~ e 3 < e h
Utility functions: 5 5 10
The ambushers
Preference relations: e k < e 2 < e 3 < e 1
Utility functions: 1 6 10
5 . Payoff Functions
The outcome functions and the utility functions de-
termine the following payoff functions table for all pos-
sible sets of pure strategies.
The payoff functions are obtained from the general
formula
t^ (a 1# a 2 , ..., an )




where u- is the utility function
p(a 1# a 2 , ..., a ) = r is outcome function
a = (a
1 ,
a 2 , . .., a ) is pure strategy vector
One can notice here that if:
s_ = (s lf s 2 / ..., sR ) is mixed strategy vector
then the outcome function for mixed strategy vector is
P(s
x 2 ' n'
3j ;S , • . &
p ( a j , a 2/ . . . / a )
n
s i< a i> ••• sn (an )
and the payoff function for mixed strategy vector is
H i (s i' s 2' "* sn^
= u
i f p ^









3. » ^ 3.A ^ * • • dn
Sl ( ai ) ... sn (an )
H






It can be seen from the payoff function table that
there is no optimal pure strategy for either of the two
players. This is in fact a non cooperative two-person non-
zero sum game.
Aboat ambush boat Hambush
1 1 0.80+0.80+0.40 = 2.00 6.40+0.16+0.96 = 7.52
1 2 2.40+0.40+1.20 = 3.00 3.20+0.48+0.48 = 4.16
2 1 1.35+0.35+0.30 = 2.00 6.30+0.27+0.42 = 6.99
2 2 0.25+2.25+4.50 = 7.00 0.50+0.05+2.70 = 3.25
3 1 0.05+4.05+0.90 = 5.00 0.90+0.01+4.86 = 5.77





Thus the game looks as follows:
G = { I, C, Ai# n ± }
I = { Boat, Ambushers } = C
Aboat ~ { ^oat' Aboat' ^oat }
A. = { h[ A' }ambush L "ambush ' "ambush
and the Hj_ are as specified in the payoff function table.





(2, 6.99) (7, 3.25)
(5, 5.77) (4, 3.51)
Let consider a pair of mixed strategies (x, 1-x) and
(y, 1-y) , i.e., the two players use their second and first
strategy with probability x and y respectively. The ex-
pected payoffs are then
Hblue (x,y) = 2xy + 7x(l-y) + 5(l-x)y + 4(l-x)(l-y)
= 4 + 3x + y(l-6x)
H
r d (x,y) - 6.99xy + 3.25x(l-y) + 5.77(l-x)y + 3.51
(1-x) (1-y)
= 3.51 + 2.26y + x(0.26 - 0.48y)
From these expressions, when x = 1/6, the Blue force
can secure an expected payoff of 4.5 for itself regardless
24

of what the opponent does. The Red force can in the same
way make its expected payoff equal to 4.73 by choosing
y = 13/24.
Note that if the Red force knows that the Blue force
is an incarnate pessimist/ bound to use a minimax strategy,
it can put this knowledge to profitable use. From the
expression
HRed (1/6, y) = 3.55 + 2.18y
the Red force will see that by choosing y=l, it can increase
its expected payoff to 7.73. The Blue force may, however,
argue in the same way and get higher expected payoff. There-
fore it may be risky to depart from the minimax strategy.
Thus, since x = 1/6 and y = 13/24 for the minimax
strategy, it is assumed that the Blue force would mostly
use its third strategy, i.e., sail close to inside of the
bend and that the Red force would use its first strategy,
i.e., ambush from the outside of the bend. Therefore this
set of pure strategies is assumed to be the starting point
for the two forces after the initial ambush.
B. /ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION: A STATISTICAL DECISION THEORY
PROBLEM
A more sophisticated approach to the solution of the
above problem is to model it as a statistical decision
theory problem. In this approach, one would try to find
how best one could make one's own decision among the avail-
able courses of action according to one's own principle.
25

Thus, in this case, one player would become a decision
maker and his opponent's courses of action would be con-
sidered as the states of nature that the decision maker
is goint to encounter.
The decision maker, without knowing the outcome of the
engagement x as well as the state of nature w, must make a
decision the consequences of which will depend on the out-
come of the engagement as well as on the state of nature.
Based on past combat experiences and/or judgments, it is
assumed that there exists a probability distribution Fw (x)
on the space of the states of nature whose value is
specified for each outcome x and that there exists a
utility function u(r) on the set of the rewards r.
In this approach, the patrol boat's Captain will be
treated as the decision maker. Tables 1, 2 and 3 will
summarize all the data necessary for him based on which
he could make various decisions according to his own
principles which in turn may depend on the different
military situations in which he is taking part.
Now, in this type of decision problem, it has become
standard to specify for each reward r e R the negative of
its utility, rather than its utility, and to call this
number the loss. Hence, for each state of nature w e Q,
and each action a e A, the loss £(w,a) is defined by the
equation
:
Jt (w,a) = - U[a (w,a) ]
26

For any decision d e D, the expected loss or risk p(w,d)
is specified by the equation:
p(w,d) = / fc(w,a) dFw (d(x)=a)
Table 4 and 5 give the loss function and all possible
decisions available for the decision maker, namely, the
patrol boat's Captain. Among all these decisions, only the
decisions which are not inadmissible are admissible. A de-
cision d within a class of decisions D is called inadmis-
sible if there is another decision d' e D such that
£(w, d') < £(w, d) for all w e ft
and £(w, d 1 ) < £(w, d) for at least one weft
All admissible decisions functions for the problem of
a riverine ambush are d
x ,
d 19 , d 21 , d 27 and d 81 .
The principles of choice and the corresponding decision
functions (Figs. 3 and 4) :
1
.
Principle of Insufficient Reason or Laplace
According to this principle, for each d e D, find
2
the average loss £(d)=l/n E £ (w^ , d) and d which minimize
i=l
£(d). Therefore the decision that the boat's Captain would
make is decision d zl which can be stated as: take action a ;
when the desired outcomes are Xj and x
3
and take action a
3
when the desired outcomes are x 2 and x k .
2 Minimax Principle or Von Neumann and Morgenstern
Principle
According to this principle, for each d e D, find


































r 6 r 5


































0.2 0.2 0.35 0.25
Table 2. Probability Distribution.
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Zero utility: status quo
Range of utility = 1.0
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The minimax loss v is
v = inf mp £(w, d) = sup £(w, d°)
deD wefi wefl
Thus the decision the boat's Captain would make if
he follows this principle is decision d • . = (1/3 d 2 i
/
2/3 d 19 ) which can be stated as: One out of three times, use
decision d 21 and two out of three times, use decision d 19
which suggests to take action a
:
when the desired outcomes
are Xj , x
2
and x^ and to take action a 3 when the desired out-
come is x .
3
.
Principle of Minimax Regret or Savage
According to this principle, instead of working with
the loss £(w, a) , compute the regret g (w , a) = £(w, a) - inf
aeA
£(w, a) , then apply Minimax Principle to (ft,A,g)
.
Thus, if following this principle, the boat's Captain
would take decision dg = (4/27 d 19 , 23/27 d 21 ).
4 Principle of Pessimism-Optimism or Hurwicz
According to this principle, choose a number O^a^l
such that
asup £(w,d) + (1-a) inf £(w,d) = I (d)
weft weft
then find d which minimizes I (d) . a is called degree of
pessimism. Thus if a = 0.8, the boat's Captain would make
decision d which happens to be dm . . in this case.Hurwicz minimax








Let P or prior distribution be a probability dis-
tribution on ft then compute the Bayes risk p(p,d)
p(P,d) = E 'U(w,d)> = / Mw,d)dP(w)p
ft
then find d* which minimizes p(P,d) . Thus according to this
principle, there are an infinite number of decisions which
depend on the prior distribution and which form a Bayes Risk
functional p*(P). Suppose P = (1/5, 4/5) then this principle
suggests to use decision d
:
which states that the boat's




It can be seen from Fig. 4 that when the prior P
has the value for the probability of w 2 greater than 73/127,
it is suggested that the boat's Captain should always take
action a 3 which is to sail his boat close to the outside of
the bend. The reason is that the patrol boat's Captain is
assumed to prefer the outcome of the engagement to be x 4
which is the situation where the boat is intact and the
ambushers are destroyed.
In any case, for the boat's Captain, only action a 2
and a
3
are worth consideration. Under no circumstances
should he take action a
:
which is to sail his boat in the





Hurwicz cona CC = 0.02
pcw,,d)









Figure 4. Bayes Risk Functional.
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IV. AFTER THE INITIAL AMBUSH: SOME COMBAT MODELS
A. GENERAL NOTIONS
Military experience has long suggested that the outcome
of an engagement - as opposed to a war - is dependent on the
interaction between weapon characteristics and the tactics
employed [Ref. 9].
Several different modelling techniques are used to fore-
cast combat outcomes when different tactics are used. These
techniques combine the weapon system performance with the
tactics. Specifically, this study considers deterministic
and stochastic models applied in insurgent and counter-
insurgent warfare.
Deterministic Lanchester-type models of warfare are
commonly considered to deal with the losses on opposing
sides when large numbers of combatants are involved and
when various assumptions about the loss rates are made.
Although not mathematically correct, solutions of the de-
terministic equations are frequently interpreted as expected
numbers of surviving combattants [Ref. 10].
However, Snow (1948) [Ref. 11] indicated that the ex-
pected value solutions imply underlying probability distri-
butions and suggested a stochastic analysis of Lanchester's
equations. Snow and Morse and Kimball [Ref. 12] have
shown that in simple cases at least, the difference-
differential equations applicable to the probabilistic
treatment give a good approximation to the Lanchester's
equations, especially for small t.
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Another interesting approach to the stochastic models is
the theory of stochastic duels which is concerned with the
microscopic features of combat such as individual kill prob-
abilities, time between rounds fired, ammunition limitations,
cover, concealment, surprise, mobility, and so forth. This
is a sharp distinction to Lanchester's theory which aggregates
all these effects [Ref. 13],
Now, for the patrol boat, after the initial ambush, there
are several available courses of action or tactics to be
employed. In the patrol boat Captain's planning horizon,
these tactics depend on how he judges the general situation,
i.e., how he estimates his enemy's strength such as force
size, type of weapons and fire-power. They also depend on
the various mathematical models of combat used to find the
outcome of the fighting.
Thus, depending on different combat situations and dif-
ferent combat models which in turn depend on the assumptions
made according to the models themselves and to the tactics
being used, one can have various solutions to the problem
at hand.
B. FIRST SOLUTION: A DYNAMIC COMBAT MODEL
One of the extensions in the development of the Lanchester
theory of combat is a model of dynamic combat which incorpor-
ates the effects of mobility and range-varying attrition rates
on the outcome of an engagement.
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1 . The Strategies
After the initial ambush, although the ambushers or
the Red force have already lost their initial advantage,
they are nevertheless assumed to go on with the fighting in
the hope of inflicting more damage to the boat until either
the number of their casualties approaches the order of n
percent or the boat breaks contact.
As for the ambushees or the Blue force, from their
position close to the inside of the bend of the river, the
patrol boat's Captain, according to past combat experiences
and/or judgments of the military experts, is assumed to
have three options
:
a. Engage the ambushers with small arms by turning
around and keeping the boat close to the inside of the bend
of the river (course A - Fig. 5) as many times as necessary
until either the enemy breaks contact or the number of his
casualties approaches the order of m percent. If the enemy
breaks contact, then the patrol boat would use artillery
for p minutes. The number of tube of artillery available
onboard the patrol boat at this moment is g.
b. Engage the ambushers with small arms in an ex-
cessive way by turning around and going straight to land
right in front of the enemy, thus causing the enemy to
abandon his hiding and break contact (course B - Fig. 5).
The patrol boat then uses artillery for p minutes. The
number of tube of artillery available aboard the patrol
boat at this moment is g.
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c. . Turn left and try to break contact by going
straight ahead then use artillery for p minutes once out
of the effective firing range of the enemy. The number
of tube of artillery available onboard the patrol boat is
again g.
2. The Model
Bonder has developed the extensions of Lanchester
equations to investigate the effects of mobility and range
dependencies of weapon systems. He has done this by formu-
lating a model which considers mobility and the influence
of range on the attrition-rate coefficients. The attrition











x = number of Blue force survivors at time t
y = number of Bed force survivors at time t
a(r) = Red force weapon attrition rates or kill rates
or the rate at which a single y unit destroys
a single x unit
b(r) = Blue force weapon attrition rates or kill rates
or the rate at which a single x unit destroys
a single y unit.
By the chain rule
dx dx dr dx
dt dr dt dr
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where v is the speed of the Blue force and r is the range
from static Red force to mobile Blue force, equations (1)
and (2) become
dx







when v = v(r) and the ratio of attrition rate constant
a(r) = ka g(r)
b(r) = kb g(r)
equations (3) and (4) have the following solution [Ref. 14]
after being transformed into second order differential
equations with initial conditions x(r = rQ ) = x and
y(r = rQ ) = yQ :
x(r) = xQ cosh 0(r) -
y(r) = yQ cosh 0(r)
-
where 0(r) = \ k ak fe /
g(r)
yQ sinh 0(r)







Three forms of kill rate were considered by Bonder. They
are :
Linear form: a (r) = ka (l - — ) for r < RQ
Re
= for r > R,
Quadratic form: a (r) = k a (l - _ ) 2q Re
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Cosine form a (r) =
Trr






When v is constant and has a positive sign if the
Blue force decreases the range between the forces and has
a negative sign if the Blue force increased the range and
when both weapon systems have same effective range Re with
opening range of the engagement R , the solutions to the
equations (5) and (6) with linear attrition-rate coefficient
are :
x(r) = xQ cosh 0(r) +
y(r) = yQ cosh 0(r) +












- R ) 2 ]
With quadratic and cosine attrition rate coefficient,












kb Re\l k akb . JV *r .(RQ - r) + , [sin( )-sin(—)]
2v 2ttv Re Re
3 . The Assumptions
The above Lanchester-type equations and the riverine
fighting after the initial ambush are based upon the follow-
ing assumptions:
a. Two opposing forces are engaged in a fight.
Units on each side are identical but the rate of attrition
caused to the opponent may be different for each force.
b. When no artillery is used and when neither side
tries to break contact , each unit on either side is within
effective weapon range of all units of the other side.
c. Each unit is informed about the location of the
remaining opposing units so that when a target is destroyed,
fire may be immediately shifted to a new target.
•
d. Fire is uniformly distributed over remaining
units
.
e. If the Blue force decides to turn around fol-
lowing course A or B (Fig. 5) , it would, choose to turn
around at the range between forces and it would turn right
away with no time lost.
f. The fight begins right after the initial ambush
and this starting time also coincides with the moment when
the Blue force starts to return fire.
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g. The range between the two forces increases or
decreases uniformly, i.e., the Blue force would increase or
decrease its speed following the courses A or B or C in
such a way that the relative speed of the Blue force with
respect to the Red force is always constant.
h. The attrition rate coefficients of both forces
have a linear form when the Blue force follows either
course A or B or C.
i. When the Red force breaks contact, due to the
terrain conditions onshore, the Blue force has to use the
artillery while the Red force cannot return fire anymore.
j. When the Red force breaks contact, its force
would be dispersed right away, therefore causing the Blue
force to use area fire with its artillery. The Blue force
artillery attrition rates become time dependent and vary
exponentially with negative time while the Red force weapon
attrition rates become zero. Thus, the Lanchester-type






-b(t)xy = -k/e-txy (9)
dt D
Therefore x = xQ
where x is a constant and equal to the number of tubes of









/ — = -k£ xQ J e-t dt
or log y(t) = log y + k£ xQ (e
t
- 1)
Finally: y(t) = yQ e
k k> xo ^ e_t " D
in which y = initial number of survivors of the Red
force at the time it breaks contact
and k^ = Blue force artillery attrition rate at
the time the Red force breaks contact
k. When the Blue force breaks contact by following
course C, it would increase its speed up to 1.5 v.
4. The Input Data
a. The Attrition Rates
As analysis of the model proceeds, it is deter-
mined that the values given in the literature for attrition
rates are too high. A battle fought with either side having
an attrition rate of 0.04 as used by Schaffer would be over
in a couple of seconds. Further investigation of Schaffer 's
value reveals that he has used a small target approximation
with a value of 0.1 ft 2 for the exposed area of a rifleman.
This is an extremely small value and could not be justified
by any analysis. An attempt is made to use Barfoot's har-







where T is time to destroy target
(t a-tf ) (tm-t f ) 1-P(h|h)
E[T] = ta+ti+th+ + [ + P(h|h)-p]
P(K|H) P(h|m) P(K|H)
where [Ref. 16]
t = time to acquire target
tj = time to fire first round after target acquired
t, = time to fire a round after sensing hit on previous
round
t = time to fire a round after sensing miss on previous
round
tf = time of flight of projectile
P(k|h) = probability of kill given a hit
A special case assumes that:
(1) target acquisition time negligible t a =
(2) t j=tu=tm=t=l/v where v = rate of fire
(3) independent rounds P(h | m) =P(h | h=p=single
shot hit probability then




a = length of target in one dimensional space
a
2
= variance of impact point
Suppose that a = 0.5 ft, a = 9 ft, v= 10 rounds/
minute, P(K|H) = 0.25 then p = 0.02 and k a = (10) (0.25) (0.02)
= 0.05 therefore, the values are still unrealistic.
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In order to get around this problem, values of
2.10 -5 and 2.10 -6 are chosen for Blue force attrition rates
coefficient for small arms (b^) and the value of 0.02 is




Although H. K. Weiss (19 53) has noted that one
of the deficiencies in the original Lanchester theory is
that engagements that continue until one side is wiped out
are rare and retreat begins when the number of casualties
approaches the order of 10%, in this problem of a riverine
ambush, according to combat experiences in Vietnam, it is
assumed that the Red force would break contact when n = 20%
and the Blue force would break contact when m = 25%. Further-
more when the Blue force breaks contact, it would run away for
good without using any artillery.
c. The Artillery
It was assumed that the patrol boat had g = 4
tubes of artillery with the effective range of 2000 meters.
They are assumed to be intact through-out the fighting and
to be used for a period of p = 20 minutes.
d. The Speed
v = 7 knots = 3.5 meters/second
5. The Output Data
Numerical results for the model are obtained from
the three computer program written in FORTRAN IV language;
this program is shown on pages 67, 68, 69, 70. These
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programs give the Blue and Red force strengths for every ten
meters of either increasing or decreasing force separation
when both forces use small arms. They also give the Red
force strength when Red force breaks contact or when Blue
force starts to use artillery. The casualty ratios between
Red force and Blue force were obtained from these terminal
force strengths.
Eight different cases are considered. The results
are summarized in Table 6.
6 . Discussion of Results
Table 6 shows the effects of attrition rate coeffi-
cients , initial force strengths and the strategy used on the
outcome of the engagement, namely, the casualty ratios be-
tween the Red force and the Blue force.
Within this model, it appears that the third strategy
offers the best solution to the patrol boat's Captain. How-
ever, when the attrition rates have the values around 10" 5
which are relatively high, there is not much difference be-
tween the outcomes in all three strategies. Therefore, it
would be better for the boat to use the second strategy
since in this strategy, the effects of psychology were not
considered. These effects were accomplished when the am-
bushers suddenly saw something big and made with steel
coming right in front of them, firing at them of such volume
and accuracy that they would rather seek cover by running
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When the attrition rates have the values around 10" 6
which are normal then there is a difference between the three
strategies. Although in this case the third strategy is
again the optimum strategy, the second strategy is neverthe-
less worth-while to be seriously considered. There are three
reasons for this consideration. First of all, it would
boast the morale of the boat's crew as well as the morale of
the unit to which the patrol boat belongs. Secondly, the
casualty ratios are higher than the ones in the first strategy
and thirdly, as mentioned above, the effects of psychology
and suppression are no less important.
The Blue force would try to break contact in all
strategies when case V is the current situation. However,
since all three casualty ratios have the same value which
is in favor of the Red force, the second strategy seems again
to be the best solution to the patrol boat if the three above
considerations are taken into account.
C. SECOND SOLUTION: A STOCHASTIC MODEL
In the probabilistic development of the Lanchester theory,
some of the desired results are the following:
1. the probability of m, n survivors at time t
2. the probability that one side wins
3. the expected number of survivors
However, when the original force strengths M and N are
of any realistic size, the solutions become too complicated
to be of direct practical use [Ref. 10]. Therefore, this
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model can be applied to the problem of a riverine ambush
when both sides, the Red force and the Blue force, use
artillery or rockets with the assumption that when either
side can score a direct hit, it would put out of action x




After the initial ambush, if the ambushers on the
Red force continue to use artillery to attack the patrol
boat, and if the patrol boat's Captain judges that it would
be better for his side to counter-attack with his atrillery,
then he is usually assumed to have two options:
a. Slow down the boat and try to stay in one place
so that the counter-attack can be launched with greatest
accuracy. This return-fire would go on for a planning
horizon of t minutes.
b. Turn left and try to break contact by going full
straight ahead and at the same time, use artillery to fire
on enemy position until both sides are out of their weapon
systems effective range. In this case, due to terrain con-
ditions and also due to types of weapon systems , it is
assumed that the attrition rates do not vary with range and
that they are small compared with the ones in the first
strategy.
2. The Model




a. The attrition process is Markov. The Markov
property assumes that, from any instant of time, the be-
havior of the system depends on the state of the system
at that instant and not on the previous history of the
system.
b. The process possesses a stationary transition
mechanism. A stationary transition mechanism assumes that
events which occur in a given time interval depend only on
the state of the system at the beginning of the interval,
and on the length of the interval - not on the instant at
which the time interval begins.
c. During interval of length At, the probability
of both forces simultaneously losing a unit is negligible




P(m,n,t) = probability that there are m,n survivors
after a time interval (o,t)
A(m,n) = Blue force weapon attrition rate which
is equal to k n for square-law attrition
process
B(m,n) = Red force weapon attrition rate which is
equal to k^m for square-law attrition
process
A(m,n)At = probability of one Blue casualty in in-
terval from t to t+At
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B (111,11) At = probability of one Red casualty in in-
terval from t to t+At
Based on the above assumptions, the system can
arrive at state (m,n) after the interval (o,t+At) in three
mutually exclusive ways
a. (m,n) survivors at time t, Blue and Red
casualties in At
b. (m+l,n) survivors at time t, 1 Blue and Red
casualties in At
c. (m,n+l) survivors at time t, Blue and 1 Red
casualties in At
Observe that:
Probability of no casualty on either side during
interval from t to t+At = [1-A(m,n) At] [1-B (m,n) At] =
1 - [A(m,n) + B(m,n)]At + 0((At) 2 )
Hence, by ignoring term 0((At) 2 ):
P(m,n,t+At) = P(m,n,t) [1-A(m,n) At - B(m,n)At]
+ P (m+l,n,t) A(m+l,n) At
+ P(m, n+1, t)B(m, n+l)At















— = anP(m+l,n,t)+bmP (m,n+l,t)
dt
- (bm+an) P (m,n ,t)
To solve this equation for the case m = M-l , n = N:
dP(M-l,N,t)
— = aNP(M,N,t) -[b(M-l)+aN]P(M-l,N,t)
dt
with P(M-1,N,0) =





with P(M,N,0) = 1
hence P(M,N,t) = e"(bM+aN)t
Therefore, by letting p(t) = P(M-l,N,t), one gets:
— + [b(M-l)+aN]p(t) = aNe -^4" 3^ 1
dt
Then, by making the left hand side of this differ-
ential equation exact and after integrating, one gets [Ref.
15] :
P(M-l,N,t) = - (l-e"bt ) e-[b(M-l) +aN]t
b
With similar development, for the case m = M-2,
n = N, one case also have




3 . The Input and Output Data
For a fixed planning horizon of t = 20 minutes, let
the artillery attrition rates when the boat stays in one
place in the first strategy be ten times greater the
artillery attrition rates when the boat tries to break con-
tact in the second strategy.
In order to obtain what could be considered reason-
able and valid results, values of 0.01, 0.02, 0.04 and 0.08
are chosen for the artillery attrition rates when the boat
stays in one place. These values are chosen from several
which have been used in an analysis of the model on the
computer.
To determine which strategy is optimu, it is decided
to use the ratios between the probability P(M-l,N,t) and the
probability P(M,N-l,t). The strategy that has lower ratio
is considered as better than the other.
When M=N=4 , P(M-l,N,t) represented the probability
that there are 3 groups left in the 4 group bloc of the
Blue force and the 4 group bloc of the Red force remains
intact. Similar representation for P (M,N-1 , t) . In some
cases where there is a fluctuation of the values of the
probabilities, it is decided to take the value of the ratio
in the last time incremental step.
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4 . Discussion of Results
Table 7 shows the effects of the artillery attrition
rate coefficients/ initial force strengths and the strategy
used on the outcome of the engagement as measured by the
ratio of elements of the probability state vector, namely
P(M-l /N / t)
P(M /N-l / t)
Computations were performed with many different
attrition rates judgmentaly selected. However, in many
cases, the combat outcomes that resulted were quite in-
tuitively inadmissible in that they did not agree with the
author's past combat experiences and judgments.
Within this model, when the attrition rates are
relatively small which have the values around 0.01 (cases
I, II and V) , there seems to be no difference between the
available strategies, regardless of the force strengths.
When the attrition rates are around 0.04 (cases
II, IV and VI) if the Red force has higher attrition rates
then it would be better for the Blue force to try to break
contact by choosing the second strategy. If the Red force
has lower attrition rates then the first strategy seems to
become optimum for the Blue force.
D. THIRD SOLUTION: A STOCHASTIC DUEL WITH DISPLACEMENT
In this stochastic duel two contestants A and B begin
with infinite ammunition supplies and fire simultaneously
at intervals (which need not be specified) . On each round
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fired each contestent has a fixed probability, p and p_
,
of killing his opponent. However, if he misses he may either
miss completely with probability r, and rB or he may have a
"near miss" with probability gA and gB . In this event of a
"near miss" the opponent must displace and take up a new
firing position. It is assumed that in making a displace-
ment a contestant loses one firing time. That is, the time
to displace is the same as the time between rounds [Ref. 17].
Thus, it can be seen that this model can be applied to
the problem of a riverine ambush when both sides, the Blue
force and the Red force, form as two separate blocs which
are the two contestants A and B described above. The force
which has greater probability in scoring a hit on its tar-
get is declared the winner. It is also assumed that with
this type of duel, both forces use artillery and that the
Red force cannot score a "near miss" since as it can be
seen in the following strategies, the Blue force is always
in the move whether it gets a miss or a "near miss".
Furthermore, the crew onboard the patrol boat do not have
to displace when the Red force can score a "near miss".
1 . The Strategies
The strategies of the Blue force after the initial
ambush in this case are similar to the ones in the second
solution, namely:
a. Slow down the boat and do not try to stay
immobile but try to move in a haphazard way so that its
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probability of being hit would be less although this may
also reduce its fire-power accuracy.
b. Turn left and try to break contact by going
straight ahead at full speed and at the same time use
artillery to fire on enemy position until both sides are
out of their weapon systems effective range. The prob-
abilities do not vary with range and the probabilities
of being hit are small compared with the ones in the
first strategy.
2. The Model
Let represent the state that a force bloc is in
a firing condition (this means it did not receive a near
miss on the previous round) and let x represent the state
that a force bloc is in a displacement condition and can-
not fire (that means that he received a near miss on the
previous round) . State probabilities for the pair A,B
on any given round n may now be represented by the nota-
yion fn ( . . ) where the first position in the argument re-
presents the state of A or the Blue force and the second
of B or Red force. Thus four states for the pair are
possible on any given round, n.
fn (00) = probability that A, B fire on n
th round
f_(0x) = probability that A fires and B does not on
the ntn round
fn (xO) = probability that B fires and A does not on
4- V*
the n round
thf (xn) = probability that neither fires on the nrn ro>und
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The matrix which gives the transition probabilities
from any state-pair to any other state-pari is
^^\^ to
froni\^^ 00 Ox xO XX




Thus the following difference equations may be written:
fn (00) = fn-l(00)rArB+fn_ 1 (0x)rA+fn _ 1 (x0)rB+fn _ 1 (xx)
fn (0x) = fn-l(00)gArB+fn.1 (0x)gA
fn (x0) = fn _ 1 (00)gB rA+fn_ 1 (x0)gB
fn (xx) = fn _ 1 (00)gAgB
where PA+rA+g a = PB+rB+^B = 1 '
The initial conditions are:
f Q (00)
= 1, f Q (0x) = f Q (xO) = f Q (xx)
=
The probability that A or Blue force wins is
,n=°° n ;
P(A) = PA (1-PB ) lnZo
f„(00) + PA En=Q fn (0x)
Ancker, Jr. and Williams [17] by transforming the
recurrence formulas into algebraic relations, gave the
solutions to P(A) as follows:















Similar formula is obtained for P(B)
.
In the case of a riverine ambush, gR = or R = 1


















The Input and Output Data
then




r = 0.6 rD = 0.7A B
9» " 0.2 g^ =
^A ^B
XA = 0.25, XB = 0.3, Rj = 1.25
P(A) = 0.369 P(B) = 0.505
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Thus the Blue force has smaller probability of
winning, therefore it would better use the second strategy,
i.e., try to break contact with the Red force.
4 . Discussion of Results
The values of P (A) and P (B) thus obtained depend on
the different values of XA , XB and R which in turn depend
on the values of pA , pB , rA , rB , gA , gB .
P (A) and P(B) can be plotted as contour map in Fig.
6. With any set of values p, , pR , r , r , g,, gB , whenever
P (A) is greater than P(B) , for the problem of a riverine









The initial purpose of this thesis was to try to develop
insight into an optimal strategy for the patrol boat patrol-
ling along a river before being ambushed at a bend of the
river and then an optimal strategy for the same patrol boat
after the ambush had been initiated.
For modelling purposes, the actual (real-world) combat
situation was conceptualized as consisting of several parts.
In the first of these, a game-theoretic model and a statisti-
cal decision theory model were used for the problem before
the ambush. It was found that the strategy to sail the boat
close to the inside of the bend of the river seemed to be
the optimum strategy for the Blue force in this stage of the
game
.
In the second stage of the game, i.e., after the ambush
had been initated, three mathematical models of combat were
used to try to find an optimal strategy for the patrol boat.
The first model was deterministic. The second and third
models were stochastic. In the stochastic model, the attri-
tion rates were assumed to be constant.
To be able to actually compare the two models, deter-
ministic versus probabilistic, it was necessary to have
time or range-dependent attrition rates in both cases and
to use the same weapons system. For this comparison,
Bonder [Ref. 10] notes that H. Weiss has observed that
there exists very little difference between probabilistic
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flow of the solution and deterministic results for forces
involving more than a few dozen men. Taylor [Ref. 18] has
also stated that a deterministic attrition model and the
expected value of the corresponding stochastic attrition
model should be in close agreement for large numbers of
combattants and small time. Otherwise there would be less
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